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The committee thanks the CAST team for their documentation and clear presentations. The 
Review committee did not find any significant problems in the technical aspects of the system as far as 
routine operation was concerned, finding that the ‘Requirements and Functionalities’ of the 3He system 
were largely satisfied. 
There were nevertheless some points to be addressed concerning single and multiple point failures 
of components which could lead to loss of 3He. These points are contained in Section I below together with 
a list of mandatory items, strong recommendations and suggestions for consideration by CAST.  Section II 
contains mandatory items and strong recommendations on general mechanical and cryogenic safety 
considerations which were not fully addressed in the TDR. Section III contains the summary and 
conclusions. 
 
I. 3 He Operational, cost and design items  
 
 
1. Vacuum systems and detectors which can be linked to the vacuum side of the cold  X-ray 
windows.   MANDATORY 
Provide a diagram all the systems (vacuum systems and detector) attached to the vacuum side of the cold 
X-ray windows and identify all possible leakage paths of  3He from system in the event of a rupture of a 
window. 
Quantify the maximum loss of  3He in the case of a quench with 120 mbar 3He, which remains  contained in 
the cold bore by a valve failure which results in a rupture of a window. 
• VT1->4 gate valves close after 1-2 secs (normal) 
• One or more VT valves fail to close 
Add additional interlocks on external vacuum systems to prevent losses of 3He. Evaluate the pressure limits 
of the detectors and strengthen or protect them from over-pressurisation so as to contain the 3He within the 
system. 
 
2. Cryo-valves   MANDATORY 
Eliminate any possibility of trapped volumes containing cold cryogenics fluid which could ultimately 
pressurize when warmed up. The cryogenic valves shall conform with European Standard EN1626. 
 
3. Manual valves which must be left open to ensure safety   MANDATORY 
For example Vs1, Vs2, V003 Vgate_R, V gate_F 
Mechanical locking system to prevent the closing of a valve required to avoid against human error 
 
4. What if quench trigger fails to reach the 3He system interlocks but still protects the magnet? 
STRONGLY RECOMMENDED 
Add a second – slower quench signal derived from pressure rise in cold bore or a temperature rise. 
 
5. Cold X-ray windows STRONGLY RECOMMENDED 
If all safety systems fail, the windows can be pressurized to ~ 2.7 bar during a quench with the full charge 
of 3He in the cold bore. It is understood that tests are planned to measure the mechanical characteristics of 
the existing windows which are expected to hold at least 2.7 bar.  
2. Include in the Cryolab tests,  a test of fatigue due to TAO’s (see point 5) 
3. Make at least 4 spare windows in case of breakage during installation or operation. 
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4. Test the window to 1.5 times the design pressure and check for plastic deformation of the strong-
back. 
5. Make a break test to establish a global safety factor. 
 
6. Allowable loss of  3He 
Estimate the annual operational losses of 3He in normal running. 
Has LLNL specified any limit to losses? Is CAST expected to pay for the losses? 
What is strategy if a large quantity of gas lost? Ask LLNL whether they will replace the gas in this event? 
Protect all flexible pipes linking magnet and off-magnet gas system. Use specially protected multi- walled 
flexible pipes.   
 
7. Thermo-Acoustic Oscillations (TAO) 
Whenever V cryo_R is opened there may be large amplitude TAO’s. Could this produce wear or fatigue on 
the X-ray cold windows? 
Use the present TAO simulation program to identify the range of pressures where this may occur. 
 
8. Errors in filling of cold bore due to human errors 
A human error could introduce the full charge of helium into the cold bore which could in case of a quench 
produce a pressure in excess of the pressure limit for those windows presently-installed. 
In the initial running periods, consider filling the storage vessel with only part of the 1m3  3He so as to limit 
the maximum pressure attainable when filling the cold bore  
 
9. Manipulations of  valves on gas system 
In view of the potential for human error, how will the valves and pumps be manipulated?  
Will all the valves be manipulated in situ or will they be controlled from a central panel. Will there be an 
interlock system (hardwired or computer) behind the controls to prevent erroneous sequences of 
manipulations?  
Aim to eliminate to a maximum the possibility for human error in manipulation of the system.  
Define clearly the procedures, train the personnel and restrict access to the system to personnel on a pre-
defined list. Since the system will be used by a number of people, consider adding a PLC, or similar,  to 
supervise and interlock  the modes of operation of the system. 
 
10. P 3He pump breakdown 
What is the strategy if the pump breaks down? 
Can the gas in the cold bore be removed? 
 
11. Manual cryo needle valves 
What if the spindle of the needle valves becomes stuck? (Open or closed) 
Study the consequences and actions if this does arise 
  
12. Table of valve failsafe status (6.6) 
Specify the status when compressed air pressure failure. 
 
13. Effect of impurities or small circuit leaks in 3He system 
If they accumulate over a year of operation – could they block the filters or other circuit elements?  
T Niinikoski believes they cannot.  
In the first year of operation, make more frequent checks on the filters to make sure no significant 
accumulation. 
 
14. Test all valves (EP and Cryo-valves) before installation 
Test cryo-valves at operating temperature in the Cryolab. 
 
15. Retro-diffusion of  oil vapour to the cold bore (and onto windows ) 
When evacuating cold bore at T~ 70K with P 3He pump, retro-diffusion could occur. 
Evaluate the possibility, consequences and preventive measures against hydrocarbon contamination in 
cold bore and on cold x-ray windows. 
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16. Storage vessel for 3He 
If it might eventually be used to transport 3He back to LLNL, ensure design satisfies transport regulations. 
 
17. Rupture discs 
Avoid using rupture discs made from graphite. 
 
18. Project cost estimates 
Do they include manpower and design? 
 
II. Safety issues  
 
1. Safety Rules and regulations  MANDATORY 
Safety rules and regulations shall be applied (CERN rules: D2, IS47…, European Directives etc). 
MANDATORY. Contact SC-GS (G. Lindell) in the event of questions. 
 
2. Definition of pressure references for all volumes / components   MANDATORY 
Produce a table containing as items the various equipment and volumes in the gas system (inside and 
outside the cryostat) together with the following specifications: 
Design pressure 
Maximum allowed pressure 
Component that protects at the maximum pressure  
 
These parameters are in any case essential for the construction of all new vessels to be used in the system. 
 
Maximum pressure in cold bore – systems to limit pressure build up.  
The design should steer the narrow path between eliminating to the maximum the potential sources of loss 
of gas or leaks and the need to ensure the protection of all volumes to their maximum allowed pressure. 
There was a discussion on whether a standard electro-pneumatic valve or a cryo-valve can be used also as a 
check valve by exploiting the fact that these valves will be forced open when the pressure difference across 
the valve exceeds a limit. The Security Commission’s view is that the check valve function is not an 
integral part of the functions of the valve and it is not certified as a safety valve and is not able to be 
routinely checked. 
 
With this optic, the ability to protect against an over-pressurisation of the 3He gas pipe-work was 
scrutinized for three cases below: 
 
2.1 Normal magnet quench 
At present, the maximum pressure in the cold bore is stated at 1.2 bar (i.e. ‘rounding up’ 0.94 bar x 1.2 SF) 
considering a quench at 130 mbar (@1.8K). This will be the result when the safety elements and the quench 
trigger work as planned. 
 
2.2 Normal magnet quench with component failure  
The maximum pressure value rises to ~ 2. 7 bar if the safety elements in the system do not connect the cold 
bore to the expansion vessel for any reason.  
The check valve Vcheck_F should open with a pressure difference of only 30 mbar. Normally the two 
manual bypass valves (V cryo_F1 and V cryo_R1) are open and allow a small gas flow around the check 
valve and the cryo-valve in any case. The cryo-valve (Vcryo_R) should be forced open at ~ 2bar (not 
guaranteed). At ~ 1.5 bar pressure difference, the warm EP valves are expected to be forced open due to 
their manner of construction (they even may start to open at >1.1bar). If 1.5 bar pressure difference is 
needed to keep open the EP valves, then after a quench there will be 1.9 bar in the cold bore and 0.4 bar in 
the expansion volume. 
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MANDATORY 
Make a risk analysis 




Consider adding additional security elements in order to assure that the any pressure above 1.2 bar can be 
vented from the cold bore. For example, consider replacing V cryo_R with  a cryo-valve combined with a 
relief valve function as in the LHC quench valves (set at 1.0 bar)- ask A Perin AT-ACR.  
As an alternative, consider a rupture disc linking the cold bore to the expansion volume? 
Check whether the forced-opening pressure threshold of the EP and cryo-valves is dependent on the 
compressed air pressure.  
 
2.3 Exceptional pressurization due to large quantities of undetected cryo-pumped air   
In this case, a quench will not raise temperatures so high as to produce a rapid pressurization from the 
layers of solid air, but a sustained rise in temperature of the whole magnet (e.g. in the event of a break in 
the cryostat isolation vacuum) would slowly increase the pressure. The committee was concerned that there 
was no sure way to protect the magnet from a dangerous pressurization in this extreme case. (Note that if 
the 30 litre cold bore was filled with cryo-pumped air and then heated, a maximum pressure of ~ 20 bar 
could result).  
 
MANDATORY 
Make a risk analysis 
Any scheduled warm-up of the magnet must be carefully supervised and all volumes pumped continuously. 
 
STRONGLY RECOMMENDED 
Consider adding extra securities to the system, for example: 
• A recognized security relief valve in parallel with V cryo_R  or  a cryo-valve combined with a 
relief valve function as in the LHC quench valves (set at 1.0 bar)- ask A Perin AT-ACR 
• Investigate if a cryogenic ‘diverseur’ exists which can limit the pressure in cold bore to below 
1bar? 
• A rupture disc linking the cold bore to the isolation vacuum or preferably,  a double rupture disc 
linking the cold bore to the outside of the cryostat( and a helium containment balloon?) Note that 
this is the only security which would work in the event of all safety valves being stuck closed due 
to cryo-pumped deposit. The pressure limit for the rupture disc should protect the pressure limit of 
the 3He  pipe-work inside of the cryostat (believed to be 3bar – M Genet TS-MME) 
• Investigate how to identify or minimize air-leaks into the cold bore region (cold traps at entrance 
to cryostat? Routine checks in vacuum with residual gas analysers?  
• Contact Serge Claudet AT-ACR for an exchange of experience re: protection from and detection 
of leaks in installations connected to 1.8K cryogenics systems. 
 
3. Sizing of safety devices MANDATORY 
Sizing of all safety devices (rupture discs/safety valves): calculations shall be done to make sure that the 




III. Summary and Conclusions  
 
In order to clear the way for the final design and ordering of components, CAST is requested to send rapid 
feedback to the Review Committee on the points raised above. At this point a follow-up meeting or 
video/audio conference could be arranged if required.  
 
 
 
